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Abstract. Inspired by the paper of de Alfaro, Henzinger and Majum-
dar [2] about discounted µ-calculus we show new surprising links between
parity games and different classes of discounted games.
1 Introduction
One of the major results in the theory of stochastic games states that the value
of mean-payoff games is the limit of the values of discounted games [7, 4]. Re-
cently de Alfaro, Henzinger and Majumdar [2] presented results that seem to
indicate that it is possible to obtain parity games as an appropriate limit of
multi-discounted games. In fact, the authors of [2] use the language of the µ-
calculus rather than games, but as the links between µ-calculus and parity games
are well-known since the advent [3] it is natural to wonder how discounted µ-
calculus from [2] can be reflected in games.
Suppose that A is our arena with each vertex belonging to one of the two
players 0 and 1. If the current state s belongs to player P then he chooses
an outgoing edge (s, s′) and the system moves to the target state s′. Suppose
that the states are labeled by priorities from the finite set D = {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Inspecting thoroughly the formulas of the discounted µ-calculus from [2] it is
not too difficult to discover that it corresponds to the following games. Let us
associate with each priority d ∈ D a discount factor λd from the interval (0; 1).
Let d0d1d2 . . . be an infinite sequence of priorities visited during the play. Then
we calculate the payoff obtained by player 0 from player 1 using the formula
∞∑
i=0
λd0 · · ·λdi−1(1− λdi)ri (1)
when
rd =
{
0 if the priority d is odd
1 if the priority d is even
? This research was supported by European Research Training Network: Games and
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The fact that such games have values and optimal strategies, and in the case of
perfect information stochastic games even positional optimal strategies, is known
since the seminal paper of Shapley [9]. The results of [2] indicate that
lim
λ0↑1
. . . lim
λk−1↑1
valλ(s) = val(s) (2)
where valλ(s) is the value of the multi-discounted game with the payoff (1) for
the initial state s and val(s) is the value of the parity game for the initial state
s (more precisely we should take in this case the following version of the parity
games: player 0 wins 1 if the smallest priority visited infinitely often is even,
otherwise he wins 0).
The first point to note is that if we are in the realm of games rather than
µ-calculus then it is completely artificial to limit the numbers ri appearing in (1)
to 0 and 1, it would be much more natural to consider the games with any real
valued ri (and this is of course the point of view adopted by Shapley [9]). Thus
now we assume that states are labeled rather by pairs (d, r) ∈ D×R composed of
a priority d and a real number r. If during an infinite play we visit the sequence
(d0, r0), (d1, r1), . . . of labels then we can still calculate the payment obtained by
player 0 from player 1 using the formula (1). What about the equation (2) in
this case? Does there exists a game that replaces the parity game and such that
its value can be put on the right hand side of the equality (2)? As it turns out
the things go correctly and such games, priority mean-payoff games, exist. In
fact priority mean-payoff games were previously introduced in [5] where it was
proved that they admit optimal positional strategies. In this paper we show that
their values are related to the values of multi-discounted games, generalizing
3the result of [2].
The formula (2) has a rather limited interest, we would prefer to find a link
not only between the game values but also between their optimal strategies. To
this end in Section 4 we introduce a new family of discounted games: priority
discounted games. They have a considerable advantage over multi-discounted
games: their values depend on only one parameter, i.e. to find the limits of their
values we do need to use iterated limits. And, what is more important, it is
possible to carry out to this framework the concept of Blackwell optimality [6]:
for all values of the discount factor sufficiently close to 0, the optimal strategies in
priority-discounted games are also optimal for priority mean-payoff games. Note
that since the parity games are just a very special subclass of priority mean-payoff
games this result establishes a rather unexpected property of parity games. Can
it be used in practice to calculate optimal strategies for parity games? This is
the main open problem.
3 This is not really exact, since [2] examines the µ-calculus corresponding to perfect
information stochastic systems while in our paper we limit ourselves to deterministic
games. The full generalization to the stochastic case remains to be done.
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2 Games
An arena is a tuple A = (S0, S1, A,<), where S0 and S1 are the sets of states
controlled by player 0 and player 1 respectively, A is the set of actions and < is
the set of rewards.
By S = S0 ∪S1 we denote the set of all states. Then A ⊆ S×<×S, i.e. each
action a = (s′, r, s′′) ∈ A is a triple composed of the source state source(a) = s′,
the target state target(a) = s′′ and a reward r = reward(a) ∈ <.
An action a is available at state s if a ∈ As, where As denotes the set of
actions with source s.
We consider only arenas where the sets of states and actions are finite and
such that for each state s the set As of available actions is non-empty.
A path in arena A is a finite or infinite sequence p = a0a1a2 . . . of actions
such that ∀i, target(ai) = source(ai+1). The source of the first action a0 is the
source, source(p), of the path p. If p is finite then the target of the last action is
the target, target(p), of p.
It is convenient to assume that for each state s there is an empty path 1s
with the source and the target s.
Two players 0 and 1 play on A in the following way. If the current state s
is controlled by player P ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. s ∈ SP , then player P chooses an action
a ∈ As available at s, this action is executed and the system goes to the state
target(a).
Starting from an initial state s, the infinite sequence of consecutive moves
of both players yields an infinite sequence p = a0a1 . . . of executed actions such
that source(p) = s. Such sequences are called plays, thus plays in this game are
just infinite paths in the underlying arena A.
We shall also use the term “a finite play” as a synonym of “a finite path”
but “play” without any qualifier will always denote an infinite play.
An infinite sequence r0r1r2 . . . of rewards is finitely generated if there exists
a finite subset <′ of < such that all elements of this sequence belong to <′. The
set of all infinite finitely generated sequences of < is denoted <ω .
By <∗ we denote the set of all finite sequences of < and we set <∞ = <∗∪<ω .
Each path p = a0a1 . . . yields a sequence of rewards
reward(p) = reward(a0) reward(a1) . . . . (3)
Note that since our arenas are finite, if p is an infinite path then reward(p) is
finitely generated.
A utility mapping
u : <ω → R (4)
maps each finitely generated infinite reward sequence x ∈ <ω to a real number
u(x) ∈ R. The interpretation is that at the end of a play p player 0 receives from
player 1 the payoff u(reward(p)) (if u(reward(p)) < 0 then it is rather player 1
that receives from player 0 the amount |u(reward(p))|).
A game (A, u) is couple composed of an arena and a utility mapping.
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A strategy of a player P is his plan of action that tells him which action to
take when the game is at a state s ∈ SP . The choice of the action can depend
on the whole past sequence of moves. Thus a strategy for player 0 is a mapping
σ : {p | p a finite play with target(p) ∈ S0} −→ A (5)
such that for each finite play p with s = target(p) ∈ S0, σ(p) ∈ As.
Strategy σ of player 0 is said to be positional if for every state s ∈ S0
and every finite play p such that target(p) = s, σ(p) = σ(1s). Thus the action
chosen by a positional strategy depends only on the current state, previously
visited states and executed actions are irrelevant. To simplify the notation it is
convenient to view a positional strategy as a mapping
σ : S0 → A (6)
such that σ(s) ∈ As.
A finite or infinite play p = a0a1 . . . is said to be consistent with a strategy
σ ∈ Σ if for each i ∈ N such that target(ai−1) = source(ai) ∈ S0, we have
ai = σ(a0 . . . ai−1). Moreover, if s = source(a0) ∈ S0 then we require that
a0 = σ(1s).
Strategies, positional strategies and consistent plays are defined in the anal-
ogous way for player 1 with S1 replacing S0.
In the sequel Σ and T will stand for the set of strategies for player 0 and
player 1, Σp and Tp are the corresponding subsets of positional strategies and
finally σ and τ , possibly with subscripts or superscripts, will denote the elements
of Σ and T .
Given a pair of strategies σ ∈ Σ and τ ∈ T , there exists a unique infinite
play in arena A, denoted p(s, σ, τ), consistent with σ and τ and such that s =
source(p(s, σ, τ)). The corresponding sequence of rewards reward(p(s, σ, τ)) will
be denoted r(s, σ, τ).
Definition 1. Strategies σ] ∈ Σ and τ ] ∈ T are optimal in the game (A, u) if
∀s ∈ S, ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∀τ ∈ T ,
u(r(s, σ, τ ])) ≤ u(r(s, σ], τ ])) ≤ u(r(s, σ], τ)) . (7)
We say that a utility mapping u admits positional optimal strategies if for all
games (A, u) over finite arenas there exist positional optimal strategies for both
players.
Thus if both strategies are optimal the players do not have any incentive
to change them unilaterally: player 0 cannot increase his gain by switching to
another strategy σ while player 1 cannot decrease his loses by switching to τ .
Note that zero-sum games, where the gain of one player is equal to the loss
of his adversary, satisfy the exchangeability property for optimal strategies: for
any two pairs of optimal strategies (σ], τ ]) and (σ?, τ?), the pairs (σ?, τ ]) and
(σ], τ?) are also optimal and, moreover, u(r(s, σ], τ ])) = u(r(s, σ?, τ?)), i.e. the
value of the expression u(r(s, σ], τ ])) is independent of the choice of the optimal
strategies — this is the value of the game (A, u) at state s.
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Lemma 2. Let u be a utility mapping admitting optimal positional strategies
for both players.
(A) Suppose that σ ∈ Σ is any strategy while τ ] ∈ Tp is positional. Then there
exists a positional strategy σ] ∈ Σp such that
∀s ∈ S, u(r(s, σ, τ ])) ≤ u(r(s, σ], τ ])) . (8)
(B) Similarly, if τ ∈ T is any strategy and σ] ∈ Σp a positional strategy then
there exists a positional strategy τ ] ∈ Tp such that
∀s ∈ S, u(r(s, σ], τ ])) ≤ u(r(s, σ], τ)) .
Proof. We prove (A), the proof of (B) is similar. Take any strategies σ ∈ Σ and
τ ] ∈ Tp. Let A
′ be a subarena of A obtained by restricting the actions of player
1 to the actions given by the strategy τ ], i.e. in A′ the only possible strategy for
player 1 is the strategy τ ]. The actions of player 0 are not restricted, i.e. in A′
player 0 has the same available actions as in A. Since τ ] is positional A′ is a well-
defined finite arena and by the assumption concerning u there exists an optimal
positional strategy σ] for player 0 in A′; obviously τ ] is the optimal positional
strategy for player 1 in A′. This implies that (8) holds in A′ and therefore also
in A. ut
Lemma 3. Suppose that the utility mapping u admits optimal positional strate-
gies. Suppose σ] ∈ Σp and τ
] ∈ Tp are positional strategies such that
∀s ∈ S, ∀σ ∈ Σp, ∀τ ∈ Tp,
u(r(s, σ, τ ])) ≤ u(r(s, σ], τ ]) ≤ u(r(s, σ], τ)) , (9)
i.e. σ] and τ ] are optimal in the class of positional strategies. Then σ] and τ ]
are optimal.
Proof. Suppose that
∃τ ∈ T , u(r(s, σ], τ)) < u(r(s, σ], τ ])) . (10)
By Lemma 2 there exists a positional strategy τ ? ∈ Tp such that u(r(s, σ
], τ?)) ≤
u(r(s, σ], τ)) < u(r(s, σ], τ ])), contradicting (9). Thus ∀τ ∈ T , u(r(s, σ], τ ])) ≤
u(r(s, σ], τ)). The left hand side of (7) can be proved in the similar way. ut
3 Priority mean-payoff games as the limit of
multi-discounted games
In the sequel of this paper we fix the set of rewards to be
< = D× R , (11)
where D = {d ∈ N | 0 ≤ d < k} is fixed finite set of priorities. we shall note by
|D| = k the cardinality of D.
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3.1 Multi-discounted games
A discount mapping
λ : D −→ [0, 1)
associates with each priority a real number from the interval [0, 1). The value of
λ for a priority d ∈ D, noted λd, is called the discount factor of d.
Given a discount mapping λ we define multi-discounted utility mapping uλ.
It is convenient to define uλ uniformly for infinite as well as for finite reward
sequences t = (d0, r0), (d1, r1), . . . ∈ <
∞:
uλ(t) = (1− λd0)r0 + λd0(1− λd1)r1 + λd0λd1(1− λd2)r2 + . . .
=
∑
0≤i<|t|
λd0 . . . λdi−1(1− λdi)ri , (12)
where |t| is the length of t if t is finite and ∞ otherwise.
By an obvious adaptation of the proof of Shapley [9] one can obtain the
following theorem which in fact holds even for a more general class of perfect
information stochastic games:
Theorem 4 (Shapley). For each discount mapping λ : D → [0; 1), the multi-
discounted utility mapping uλ admits optimal positional strategies for both play-
ers. In particular each game (A, uλ) has a value valλ(s) for every initial state s.
3.2 Priority mean-payoff games
Definition 5. The priority of an infinite reward sequence t = (d0, r0), (d1, r1), . . . ∈
<ω is the minimal priority occurring infinitely often in t:
priority(t) = lim inf
i→∞
di . (13)
For any reward sequence t = (d0, r0), (d1, r1), . . . ∈ <
∞ and d ∈ N let
Πd(t) = {i ∈ N | 0 ≤ i < |t| and di = d}, (14)
be the sequence consisting of the indices for which the priority is equal d in t.
Definition 6. Let t = (d0, r0), (d1, r1), . . . ∈ <
ω be an infinite reward sequence
and let Πd(t) = i0, i1, . . . the sequence consisting of the indices i for which di =
priority(t). Then
µ(t) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
rij
defines priority mean-payoff utility mapping µ : <ω → R.
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Thus, intuitively, to calculate µ(t) we first use the priorities to choose an appro-
priate subsequence t′ = (di0 , ri0 ), (di1 , ri1 ), (di1 , ri1 ), . . . of t consisting of rewards
such that priority(t) = di0 = di1 = di1 = . . . and next we apply the usual mean-
payoff to the corresponding subsequence ri0ri1ri2 . . . of rewards.
The following result is proved in [5]:
Theorem 7. The priority mean-payoff utility µ admits optimal positional strate-
gies for both players.
The value of the priority mean-payoff game for an initial state s will be noted
val(s).
The following theorem connects multi-discount and priority mean-payoff games:
Theorem 8. Let D = {0, . . . , k−1} be the set of priorities. Then for each initial
state s
lim
λ0↑1
lim
λ1↑1
. . . lim
λk−1↑1
valλ(s) = val(s) , (15)
i.e. the value of the priority mean-payoff game is the (iterated) limit of the value
of the multi-discounted game (λi ↑ 1 means that λi tends to 1 from below).
The order in which the limits are taken in (15) does matter and is related to
the fact that in (13) we have chosen the minimal priority appearing infinitely
often as the priority of an infinite sequence of rewards. Let us note that in the
particular case when there is only one priority, |D| = 1, Theorem 8 holds in the
much larger setting of stochastic games, this is a seminal result of Mertens and
Neyman [7]. We skip the proof of Theorem 8 since it is too long to be given
here. In fact Theorem 8 will not be used in the sequel and, in our opinion, the
subsequent Section 4 contains much more interesting results which are provided
with complete proofs.
4 Priority-discounted games
In Section 3.2 we have established that the value of the priority mean-payoff
game is an iterated limit of the multi-discounted game. However, iterated limits
are cumbersome so a natural question is if we cannot replace them by a single
limit.
Another weakness of multi-discounted games is that they are related to parity
mean-payoff games only by their values but not by their optimal strategies.
In this section we introduce the class of priority-discounted games which
behave much in this respect.
Let us take β ∈ (0; 1] and, for d ∈ D, set
λd(β) = 1− β
d . (16)
A priority-discounted game is a multi-discounted game in which the discount fac-
tor associated with some priority d ∈ D is λd(β). Let t = (d0, r0), (d1, r1), . . . ∈
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<∞. Then, putting (16) into (12), we get the definition of the priority-discounted
utility mapping:
uβ(t) = βd0r0 + (1− β
d0)βd1r1 + (1− β
d0)(1− βd1)βd2r2 + . . .
=
∑
0≤i<|t|
(1− βd0)(1− βd1) . . . (1− βdi−1)βdiri . (17)
Let us note that λd(β) ↑ 1 iff β ↓ 0. The following theorem is analogous to
Theorem 8.
Theorem 9. Let A be a finite arena. Then
(i) For every finite arena A and for all β ∈ (0; 1] both players have optimal
positional strategies in the single discounted game (A, uβ).
(ii) Let valβ(s) be the value of the single discounted game (A, uβ) for an initial
state s. Then
lim
β↓0
valβ(s) = val(s) , (18)
where val(s) is the value of the priority mean-payoff game.
Proof. (i) obviously is just a special case of Theorem 4. The proof of (ii) will be
given at the end of Section 4.1. ut
4.1 Blackwell optimality
The concept known as Blackwell optimality was introduced in [1]. A readable
modern presentation can be found in [6]. Roughly speaking, a policy of a Markov
decision process with the discounted reward criterion is Blackwell optimal if it
is optimal for all discount factors sufficiently close to 1. It turns out that such
policies are also automatically optimal for mean-payoff games, hence Blackwell
optimality is stronger than the classical concept of optimality in mean-payoff
games.
We adapt here the concept of Blackwell optimality to two-person priority-
discounted games. We show that corresponding Blackwell optimal strategies exist
and that they are optimal for priority mean-payoff games.
Let us fix a finite arena A. Strategies (σ], τ ]) ∈ Σ × T are β-optimal if they
are optimal in the priority-discounted game (A, uβ) with the discount factor β.
Definition 10. Strategies (σ], τ ]) ∈ Σ × T are Blackwell optimal if they are
β-optimal for all values β in an interval 0 < β < β0 for some constant β0 > 0.
The following two lemmas will be useful for establishing the existence of
Blackwell optimal strategies in priority-discounted games, stated in Theorem 13.
In those Lemmas, we consider the different discounted-priority games obtained
when β tends to 0. In Lemma 11 we fix some finite play and describe the asymp-
totic behavior of the values of this play when β tends to 0. In Lemma 12 we
consider the case of ultimately periodic plays.
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Lemma 11. Let y = (d0, r0) . . . (dn, rn) ∈ <
∗ be a finite sequence of rewards,
a = min{d0, . . . , dn} and I = {i | 0 ≤ i ≤ n and di = a}. Then
lim
β↓0
uβ(y)
1− (1− βd0) · · · (1− βdn)
=
1
|I |
∑
i∈I
ri ,
where |I | denotes the cardinality of I.
Proof. This is just an elementary exercise: uβ(y) = βd0r0 +(1−β
d0)βd1r1 +(1−
βd0)(1−βd1)βd2r2 + . . .+(1−β
d0)(1−βd1) · · · (1−βdn−1)βdnrn = (
∑
i∈I ri)β
a +
p(β), where p(β) is a polynomial with all monomials having degree > a. Similarly,
g(β) = 1−(1−βd0) · · · (1−βdn) = |I |βa+q(β), where q(β) is a sum of monomials
of degree > a. Thus
uβ(β)/g(β) = ((
∑
i∈I
ri) + p(β)/β
a)/(|I |+ q(β)/βa)
β→0
−−−→ (
∑
i∈I
ri)/|I | .
ut
Lemma 12. Given an initial state s and positional strategies (σ, τ) ∈ Σp × Tp,
(i) the function β 7→ uβ(r(s, σ, τ))), defined for 0 < β < 1, is a rational
function4 of β.
(ii) limβ→0 u
β(r(s, σ, τ))) = µ(r(s, σ, τ))), where µ is the priority mean-payoff
utility, see Definition 6.
Proof. (i) Since σ and τ are positional, the play p(s, σ, τ) and the resulting
sequence r(s, σ, τ) of rewards are ultimately periodic. Thus, for some x, y ∈ <∗,
r(s, σ, τ) = xyyy . . . = xyω. Then (17) yields
uβ(xyω) =
uβ(x) + (1− βd0) · · · (1− βdl)uβ(y)
∞∑
i=0
[
(1− βdl+1) · · · (1− βdm)
]i
= uβ(x) +
(1− βd0) · · · (1− βdl)
1− (1− βdl+1) · · · (1− βdm)
uβ(y), (19)
where d0, . . . , dl is the sequence of priorities of x and y = (rl+1, dl+1), . . . , (rm, dm).
Since x and y are finite uβ(x) and uβ(y) are just polynomials of β.
(ii) It suffices to note that in (19), if β → 0 then uβ(x) tends to 0 while (1 −
βd0) · · · (1 − βdl) tends to 1. Thus this result is an immediate consequence of
Lemma 11. ut
We can now state our main result about Blackwell optimality in priority-
discounted games.
4 a quotient of two polynomials
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Theorem 13. For each finite arena A there exist Blackwell optimal positional
strategies.
Proof. The proof follows very closely the proof given in [6] for Markov decision
processes.
Since A is finite, the set Σp × Tp of pairs of positional strategies is finite.
Thus there exists a pair (σ], τ ]) ∈ Σp ×Tp of positional β-optimal strategies for
all β = βn, where (βn) is some sequence such that βn ↓ 0. We claim that (σ
], τ ])
are Blackwell optimal.
Suppose the contrary. Then there exists a state s and a sequence γn tending
to 0 with n →∞ such that
(i) either there exists a sequence σ?n of strategies such that u
γn(r(s, σ], τ ])) <
uγn(r(s, σ?n, τ
])),
(ii) or there exists a sequence τ?n of strategies such that u
γn(r(s, σ], τ?n)) <
uγn(r(s, σ], τ ])).
Due to Lemma 2, the strategies σ?n and τ
?
n can be chosen positional and since
the number of positional strategies is finite, taking a subsequence if necessary,
we can fix one strategy σ? and one strategy τ? for all n.
Thus we have obtained that
(1) either there exist a state s, a positional strategy σ? ∈ Σp and a sequence
(γn), γn ↓ 0, such that for all n
uβ(r(s, σ], τ ])) < uβ(r(s, σ?, τ ])) for all β = γ1, γ2, . . . , (20)
(2) or there exist a state s, a positional strategy τ ? ∈ Tp and a sequence (γn),
γn ↓ 0, such that for all n
uβ(r(s, σ], τ?)) < uβ(r(s, σ], τ ])) for all β = γ1, γ2, . . . . (21)
Suppose that (20) holds.
The choice of (σ], τ ]) guarantees that
uβ(r(s, σ?, τ ])) ≤ uβ(r(s, σ], τ ])) for all β = β1, β2, . . . . (22)
Consider the function
f(β) = uβ(r(s, σ?, τ ]))− uβ(r(s, σ], τ ])) . (23)
By Lemma 12, f(β) coincides for 0 < β < 1 with a rational function of the
variable β. But from (20) and (22) we can deduce that when β ↓ 0 then f(β)
takes infinitely many times the value 0. This is possible for a rational function
only if it is identical to 0, contradicting (20). In a similar way we can prove
that (21) entails a contradiction. These contradictions show that σ] and τ ] are
Blackwell optimal. ut
Now that we know that Blackwell optimal positional strategies exist we are
ready to show that they are also optimal for priority mean-payoff games:
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Theorem 14. If (σ], τ ]) are Blackwell optimal positional strategies then they
are also optimal for the priority mean-payoff game.
Proof. Suppose the contrary, i.e. that (σ], τ ]) is not a pair of optimal strategies
for the priority mean-payoff game. This means that there exists a state s such
that either
µ(r(s, σ], τ ])) < µ(r(s, σ, τ ])) (24)
for some strategy σ or
µ(r(s, σ], τ)) < µ(r(s, σ], τ ])) (25)
for some strategy τ . Since priority mean-payoff games have optimal positional
strategies, by Lemma 2, we can assume without loss of generality that σ and τ
are positional. Suppose that (24) holds. By Lemma 12 (B)
lim
β↓0
uβ(r(s, σ], τ ])) = µ(r(s, σ], τ ])) < µ(r(s, σ, τ ])) = lim
β↓0
uβ(r(s, σ, τ ])) . (26)
However inequality (26) implies that there exists 0 < β0 such that
∀β < β0, u
β(r(s, σ], τ ])) < uβ(r(s, σ, τ ])) ,
in contradiction with the Blackwell optimality of (σ], τ ]). Similar reasoning
shows that also (25) is in contradiction with the Blackwell optimality of (σ], τ ]).
ut
The proof of Theorem 9 (ii) is a direct consequence of Theorems 14 and 13
and Lemma 12.
4.2 Open questions
The most interesting open question is if we can, given an arena A, find an
estimate of the constant β0 from the definition of Blackwell optimal strategies.
If this were possible and β0 were not too small then we could try to find optimal
strategies for priority mean-payoff games (and therefore also parity games) by
solving priority-discounted games. And for solving priority-discounted games we
can adapt policy improvement algorithms developed for discounted games [8].
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